Immaterial infrastructures in the Mekong Region’s transboundary rivers

Dams, diversions, and increasing hydropolitical tensions

Hydraulic infrastructure construction in shared river basins has one of the most direct links to increasing hydropolitical tensions (De Stefano et al., 2017; Wolf et al., 2003a). This raising of tensions is more pronounced when the shared river does not have the institutional capacity to mediate and manage the many changes that manifest from large-scale infrastructure construction (Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017; Wolf et al., 2003b). The Mekong region has experienced a rapid roll out of hydropower dams in transboundary river basins that have these very institutional shortcomings.

This process of large scale dam construction took place simultaneously and at scale, with hundreds of dams being sited in the region's transboundary rivers. However, for many of these rivers there are no agreements, treaties, or river basin organizations in place, and limited or seasonal data sharing to monitor or mediate these drastic changes. Construction of hundreds of dams, particularly in the more mountainous upstream, is taking place in a governance vacuum that enhances power imbalances and creates an array of uncertainties at present and for decades into the future.

This process of large scale dam construction took place simultaneously and at scale, with hundreds of dams being sited in the region's transboundary rivers. However, for many of these rivers there are no agreements, treaties, or river basin organizations in place, and limited or seasonal data sharing to monitor or mediate these drastic changes. Construction of hundreds of dams, particularly in the more mountainous upstream, is taking place in a governance vacuum that enhances power imbalances and creates an array of uncertainties at present and for decades into the future.

Sudden and long term changes in these basins without adequate governance structures in place has led them to be considered as 'basins at very high risk' for conflict (De Stefano et al., 2017). The Mekong region's Salween, Ayeryarwaddy, and Red river basins are amongst the world's 22 river basins at very high risk for conflict ranging from contract arbitrations to direct forms of armed violence.

Immaterial infrastructure and conflict in the Salween River Basin (Motta et al., 2023)

Typically the connections between infrastructure and conflict in shared rivers relates to changes in material flows of water, with dams and diversions altering the quantity, quality, and timing of water. These changes in turn lead to concerns or disputes with downstream neighbors. Our research shows that these hydraulic infrastructure projects can spur armed conflict and increase tensions, even when there is no concrete poured and the project remains unbuilt.

Using the proposed Salween dam cascade and inter basin transfer in Myanmar and Thailand, we trace hydropolitical relations over decades using the Transboundary Water Interactions Nexus (TWINS) grid aside (Allan and Mirumachi, 2007). These decades of cooperation and conflict events illustrate how notions of cooperation around dam development are escalating tensions in the Salween, even in their immaterial form. Likewise, after low points in Thai-Burmese relations and high levels of violence in Myanmar, dams are used by the military to reinvigorate promises of future profits from the potential projects and hold together highly securitised relationships in the face of all diplomatic odds.

Once these projects are conceived of, the infrastructures and their proponents remain. All of the proposed projects have direct links to militaries through 'crony companies', leading to a high level of securitization around the proposed projects. The temporal aspects of infrastructure and conflict are complex, and difficult to quantify. The processes are long and have significant lag times. As shown through the Salween example, even in the immaterial form projects can carry on for decades. These attempts to cooperate around joint infrastructure development reshapes the Salween landscape even with what is not there.

If built, large scale dams have lifespans of 50-100+ years, depending. The Mekong region's rivers received hundreds of dams that were built in the same time period. It is not clear what the cumulative and longer term impact of reshaping the region's river will be, but rampant hydropower development has already been found to have a greater impact on the river systems than climate change (Hecht et al., 2019; Hoang et al., 2019; Ngo et al., 2018). Despite the dams producing more impacts than climate change, they are couched as solutions to the very same problem. There has been a proliferation of hydropower in the era of climate change, with dams receiving both investments and legitimacy from global climate change policies and finance.

Developing finance in risky rivers

Despite the conflictual realities that are associated with dam construction on international rivers, they are an attractive financial vehicle and have become even more so in the context of climate change (Ahlers et al., 2015; Ahlers 2020; Motta and Matthews, 2017). Carbon credits, offset schemes, and global climate finance rely on inflated carbon reduction and 'sustainability' claims from hydropower. Over 1,000 large-scale hydropower projects were subsidized by the UNFCCCs Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), with nearly half of the projects being slated in shared river basins. The Mekong region's 'basins at very high risk' for conflict were the top recipients globally of CDM funded dams (Motta et al. 2024, forthcoming).

These dams were legitimized as 'sustainable' and certified by the CDM to produce carbon credits that were sold to distant markets in Europe. These carbon credits from hydropower plants are still in circulation, being repackaged, sold, and used by corporations and governments to make inflated carbon reduction claims. This is a form of greenwashing, where unknowing passengers can offset their airplane travel via the UN's CORSIA scheme, which has approved the use of CDM credits until 2030 (Timperley, 2019).

The CDM funded dams went in with such speed and density, particularly in the upper catchment of the Mekong's transboundary rivers in China's Yunnan Province, that it rendered the rivers overbuilt (Cheng et al., 2018; Hennig and Harlan, 2018). The dams every year sit idle during the monsoon season and are unable to supply to the grid with energy surplus and systemic grid bottlenecks, leading these hundreds of CDM projects to severely underperform (ibid). Recently, the dams also suffered power cuts with drought causing the hydropower systems to also underperform in the dry season. However, these failures are not reflected in the carbon credits used in Europe, which are used and sold as if the system is functioning as claimed.

This is another example of the immaterial or intangible aspect of infrastructure development. In this case, distant carbon finance from Europe is enhancing hydropolitical tensions in the Mekong's transboundary rivers. Rather than being driven by tangible aspects of dam development such as energy demand or a solution to climate risks, we argue that the projects are driven by the intangible aspects of developing finance opportunities and creating carbon assets. We refer to this phenomena as the 'financialization of rivers' where the intangible financial considerations for pursuing a project outweigh the tangible drivers such as energy demand or disaster management (Motta et al. 2024, forthcoming).