A Translocal Journey to Three Territories with Mining-Caused Water Problems

- Hannah Porada

Our first travel stop: Gas extraction in Groningen, the Netherlands

Our first stop is Groningen in the Northeastern Netherlands. For decades, a (not uncontroversial) public-private partnership between the Dutch State and the Dutch Petroleum Company (NAM - Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij, a joint venture of Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil) has extracted gas from Europe’s largest gas field, covering an underground area of around 900 km2. The public-private partnership made sky-high revenues from gas extraction, summing up to approximately 363 billion euros.

Location of the Groninger gas field and gasquakes. Map with own alterations retrieved from social movement counter-mapping tool (Groninger Bodem Beweging, n.d.)

Locally, the gas extraction has resulted in 1646 earthquakes (and counting!), that we might better call gasquakes, given their human-made character. Resulting from the gasquakes, many inhabitants in the province are confronted with the damage of their houses, situations of acute unsafety, and psychological despair. On top, the politically-unable, overly-technical and bureaucratically-messy response of private companies as well as state institutions misses the reality of many Groningers by far, which is often referred to as “disaster in slow motion” (Bakema et al., 2018). For decades, inhabitants and social movements such as the Groninger Bodem Beweging have protested the gas extraction and its consequences.

Land subsidence in the Netherlands with indication of Groninger gas field area. Map retrieved from NCG (n.d.)

But how does all this relate to water? What is often overlooked is that the gas extraction not only results in the gasquakes and related socio-political dilemmas. It also leads to land subsidence, meaning that the land over the gas field is irreversibly and unevenly sinking. This complicates the water management in the area, because water levels and water infrastructures have to be meticulously controlled by the regional water authority (Waterschap Noorderzijlvest), just as elsewhere in the Netherlands. This water authority had to take various measures in a 45.000 hectares-large area affected by gas extraction-land subsidence.

The pumping station ‘Den Deel’ built to account for land subsidence from gas extraction. Photo by Roepers, CC BY-SA 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7b/Gemaal_Den_Deel.jpg

For example, the water authority re-negotiated water levels between different water users, which was rather complicated, given the uneven levels of land subsidence and different preferences among water user groups (e.g., farmers, cultural heritage organizations, urban residents). Since the water also no longer naturally drained to the sea, pumping stations had to be installed, entailing major operational and energy costs. One of the water system’s original four sub-catchment areas had to be divided into sections to ensure it could be drained. Infrastructures such as dikes and bridges had to be adjusted, too.

The land subsidence and water problems seem well solved. A compensation fund covers claims from different institutions (e.g., water authorities, municipalities). The institutional response and the generous amounts of money made available to compensate subsidence damage make the powerful interests that rendered the gas extraction-subsidence in the first place almost invisible. The water issues are therefore barely politically debated. So you might wonder why I still problematize them?

After spending months in Groningen doing field research, I ran into limits and contradictions regarding the ‘technical subsidence solutions’. For instance, a water manager I spoke to indicated that the apparently technically-manageable situation had limits. He described that the subsidence caused irreversible problems. Other water professionals criticized the naturalizing and universalizing story (see also Ahlers & Zwarteveen, 2009; Boelens & Vos, 2012) that ‘subsidence happened everywhere in the Netherlands’, emphasizing that in Groningen the major driver was the gas extraction. Inhabitants of urban areas denounced the damages of their houses as potentially resulting from the lowering of water levels due to subsidence. Others expressed concerns about the eternity costs for water management, that is to say costs and burdens that will remain after gas has been phased-out (for deeper theoretical and empirical reflections see Porada et al., 2024).

Reflections written in my travel log

The contradictions and points of criticism I encountered in my field work showed how the land subsidence and water-issues caused by gas extraction are not solely technical. Powerful depoliticizing strategies has reduced the deeply political issue to the technical realm and linked it to powerful extractive interests (for deeper theoretical and empirical reflections on the depoliticization of subsidence and water problems in Groningen, see Porada et al. (Forthcoming)). The proposed technical solutions and absence of political discussions were convenient for these powerful actors. Other interests such as the house owners that have to deal with potential damage from gas extraction-subsidence were sidelined and became invisible. Let’s keep these reflections in mind when traveling to our next stop!

The location of the Palajunoj valley in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Map provided by García Garzón (2021)

Our second travel stop: Mining of construction materials in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala

Following our visit to the Netherlands, I now invite you to join me for a trip to Guatemala’s second city Quetzaltenango. I am taking you to the Palajunoj valley, a rural area located five kilometers south of the city center and home to ten Indigenous communities. Here, construction materials (e.g., sand and stones) are mined, originally through valley families engaging in artisanal mining. Nonetheless, in 1999, bigger industrial mines started operating in the valley, linked to powerful elitist political-economic interests. The communities living in the valley were not consulted before the large-scale extraction began (as written in the ILO 169 convention ratified by Guatemala) and the mining companies operated backed up by ‘official’ licenses issued by the national ministry.

One of the mines in the valley. Photo taken by author

More than two decades of large-scale mining have heavily impacted the valley communities and their lives. People have denounced environmental degradation such as soil erosion and deforestation, respiratory issues due to the dust created by the use of explosives in the mines, and other far-reaching negative impacts on their everyday life, including the constant passing of trucks transporting the mined materials out of the valley (see also Hendriks, 2020).

Recurrent flooding of the valley. Photo in local newspaper Prensa Libre (2019)

But how do the big mines more specifically link to water issues? The large-scale mines have caused deforestation and the loss of water retaining areas in the valley. Paired with the fact that there are no drainage systems in the valley, this leads to serious flooding problems, especially during the rainy season. Fields, streets, and houses in the valley are flooded daily during the rainy season, where water reaches people’s knees. Interviews during my fieldwork showed that these issues have become much more severe in the years following the mines’ expansion.

The municipal government as well as the National Coordinating Agency for Disaster Reduction frame the floods as a natural phenomenon, especially linked to the increasing heavy rains due to climate change. In these narratives, the impacts of the big mines on the floodings are absent. Hidden behind ‘Environmental Impact Assessments’ and ‘Risk Mitigation Plans’, the loss of upstream water retaining areas to the mines is barely discussed. According to the same actors (e.g., municipal government, responsible national ministries, mining companies), the solution to the flooding is to technically manage the water flows better.

Reflections written in my travel log

The diverging narratives and conflicting opinions regarding the flooding in the Palajunoj valley show common ground with the gas extraction in Groningen. In both places, universalizing and naturalizing discourses dominate the discussions of extraction-related water problems (e.g., blaming heavy rains resulting from climate change), and technical solutions to fix the flooding are promoted. The mining, soil erosion, and deforestation happening in the valley remain politically undebated, shielding and depoliticizing powerful extractive interests. The valley inhabitants are marginalized by the slow violent character of the floods (Nixon, 2011) .

Location of the Rhenish brown coal area. Own alterations of Der Spiegel (2017)

Our third travel stop: Past and Future of the brown coal mines in the Rhineland, Germany

After visiting the Netherlands and Guatemala, let me now take you to Western Germany, to the largest brown coal mining area in Europe, the Rhenish Brown Coal Area. For decades, around 60 million tons of brown coal have been extracted each year by the mining and electric utility company RWE AG (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG) from three large open-pit coal mines (i.e., Garzweiler, Hambach, and Inden). The extraction of carbon-intensive brown coal makes Germany the biggest carbon emitter within the European Union.

The Garzweiler brown coal mine. Photo taken by author

The mines encroach huge areas of land, around 325 km2 in the Rhineland, and are up to 400 meters deep. This also means that since the 1950s around 130 villages have been destroyed and their inhabitants displaced from their original homes. More than 40,000 people have been resettled just in the Rhineland, leading to multiple hardships and injustices for the affected populations (BUND, 2017).

Taped letter box due to resettlement of village Keyenberg. Photo taken by author

The village cemetery of lost villages during protest action in spring 2019. Photo taken by author

But what does this have to do with water? In order to extract the coal, pumping stations currently lower the groundwater levels around the mines to a depth of up to 550 meters. They will be turned off when the coal mines are shut down in 2030. Coal mining is however not over when it ends, meaning that there will be so-called eternity costs of coal mining, long after the mines have been shut down. Decades ago, the political decision was made to fill the remaining massive holes with water and turn the area into a lake district. As an illustration, the lake of the Hambach mine would cover an area of about 3,550 hectares, with depths of 350 meters and a volume of more than 3 billion cubic meters of water. The Hambach lake would become the deepest lake in Germany, almost twice the volume of the famous Lake Chiemsee in Bavaria (BUND, n.d.).

Part of infrastructure to lower groundwater levels close to Garzweiler mine. Photo taken by author

Huge amounts of water are needed to fill the remaining holes and it would take centuries for the mines to naturally turn into lakes. So where is water supposed to come from? The plan is to build a 45-kilometer-long Rhine water transport pipeline, on which the final decision will be made in 2024. Already now, the plans are triggering social and environmental concerns across multiple scales. Inhabitants close to the pumping infrastructure and the pipeline have started to express their concerns about negative impacts. Since the Rhine water is polluted, it is debated what would happen once it infiltrates the ground and the groundwater body. Another questions how much water can be taken from the Rhine without damaging the ecosystem and if this water will be available given expected lower water levels. In the Garzweiler mine, there is also risk of future acidification, and critics say that technical countermeasures cannot fully account for this risk (BUND, n.d.).

Plan for the Rhine water transport pipeline. Retrieved from RWE (n.d.)

Since the planned measures will long survive the mine shut down, the question is who will pay for all of them (while acknowledging the issues are more than only monetary!). Without politically calling upon the mining company to cover all long-term costs, the taxpayers will be burdened with the long-term consequences. This is an issue local movements and environmental organizations are currently organizing around.

Reflections and final questions to reflect on in your travel log!

The travel stop in Germany has common ground with the extraction-related water issues in the Netherlands and Guatemala. As the mine shuts down and future water-related challenges are exposed, concerns about the limits and negative impacts of technical solutions are raised. Recognising the eternal burden of coal mining and questioning accountability of powerful extractive companies can inform future water management challenges in Groningen. The creeping issues triggered by open-pit mining overlap with the slow violent transformations in Guatemala.

As I leave you with my reflections grounded in my research experience, I hope you could learn something from this brief journey! If you were the travel agent, where would your journey take us? What other extractive conflicts do you know? Can they learn from or inform the realities shown here?

Dust and permanent traffic experienced by the valley communities. Video provided by Producciones Goméz

About the author

Hannah Porada

Hannah Porada is currently a PhD researcher based at the Center for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA) at the University of Amsterdam. Her research interests relate to critical geography, political ecology, environmental justice, water governance, and social movements struggles against extractivism. Her PhD research explores the impacts of extractive industries, struggles over territory and for environmental justice, and opportunities for and challenges of translocal, cross-cultural, action-research alliance building across the Netherlands (gas extraction) and Guatemala (mining of construction materials) from a political ecology perspective. Hannah has previously conducted research in the German brown coal areas close to her own home.

NEWAVE ESR8

h.m.porada@uva.nl

References

Ahlers, R., & Zwarteveen, M. (2009). The water question in feminism: water control and gender inequities in a neo-liberal era. Gender, Place and Culture, 16(4), 409-426.

Bakema, M. M., Parra, C., & McCann, P. (2018). Analyzing the social lead-up to a human-induced disaster: The gas extraction-earthquake nexus in Groningen, The Netherlands. Sustainability, 10(10), 3621.

Boelens, R., & Vos, J. (2012). The danger of naturalizing water policy concepts: Water productivity and efficiency discourses from field irrigation to virtual water trade. Agricultural Water Management, 108, 16-26.

BUND. (2017). Heated homes – villages on the red list [in German]. Retrieved Feb 2, 2019, from https://www.bund-nrw.de/themen/mensch-umwelt/braunkohle/hintergruende-und-publikationen/verheizte-heimat/

BUND. (n.d.). Residual Brown Coal Lakes [in German]. Retrieved Aug 30, 2023, from https://www.bund-nrw.de/braunkohle/hintergruende-und-publikationen/braunkohle-und-umwelt/braunkohle-und-wasser/braunkohle-restseen/

Der Spiegel (2017). Brown Coal, Fool’s Gold. Can Germany Break Its Lignite Habit?, Retrieved Aug 28, 2023, from https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/energy-transition-blocked-by-brown-coal-a-1179537.html

García Garzón, C. (2021). Reclaiming Citizenship. Contesting and Negotiating Participation and Rights: An account of the social mobilization against two development projects in Quetzaltenango (Guatemala). University of Amsterdam (Master thesis).

Groninger Bodem Beweging. (n.d.). Mapping portal gasquakes and land subsidence [in Dutch]. Retrieved Nov 22, 2022, from https://bevinggevoeld.nl/gasbevingen/

Hendriks, N. (2020). Mistrust and insecurity: conflicts over non-metallic mining in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. A micro-political analysis of municipal governance, relationships and complexities of large-scale and artisanal mining. Wageningen University (Master thesis).

NCG. (n.d.). Land subsidence map 2.0 [in Dutch]. Retrieved Aug 30, 2023, from https://bodemdalingskaart.nl/nl/

Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press.

Porada, H., Boelens, R., & Vos, J. (2024). Gas extraction governmentality: The depoliticization of Groningen’s extractive territorialization. Political Geography, 108, 103001.

Prensa Libre. (2019). Rain causes flooding and collapses roads in the Palajunoj Valley; the municipality does not attend to the emergency [in Spanish]. Retrieved Aug 31, 2023,

https://www.prensalibre.com/ciudades/quetzaltenango/lluvia-intensa-causa-inundaciones-y-colapsa-carreteras-en-el-valle-del-palajunoj-comuna-no-atiende-emergencia/

RWE. (n.d.). Rhine water transport pipeline. The route [in German]. Retrieved Aug 30, 2023, from https://www.rwe.com/forschung-und-entwicklung/projektvorhaben/rheinwassertransportleitung/aktuelles/

A Translocal Journey to Three Territories with Mining-Caused Water Problems

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Our first travel stop: Gas extraction in Groningen, the Netherlands

Reflections written in my travel log

Our second travel stop: Mining of construction materials in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala

Reflections written in my travel log

Our third travel stop: Past and Future of the brown coal mines in the Rhineland, Germany

Reflections and final questions to reflect on in your travel log!

About the author

Hannah Porada

Hannah Porada

References

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