“We use a thief to catch a thief”

The model was expanded to other informal settlements across the city. KIWASCO attempted to implement strict eligibility criteria related to financial stability and educational background. However, those with financial means and connections were still the most well-positioned to get these connections, with utility staff estimating that up to 55 cartels were still active in Kisumu’s low-income areas in 2017 (Boakye-Ansah et al., 2019).

 As the DMM matured, physical access to water improved throughout the city, but persistent gaps meant that residents still relied on alternative water sources. Though their illegibility to formal record-keeping makes it difficult to determine whether their presence increased, decreased, or remained stable, mobile vendors persisted throughout the city. 

The strong community component of the DMM was crucial to its success but came with design challenges. It required coordination between utilities and MOs related to price setting, hygiene, and cost recovery. An MO serving their own community could be in the awkward position of collecting payments from their struggling neighbors, creating tension between adhering to social norms within their community versus complying with contracts. 

‘how do I disconnect water to a fellow community member, an old mother, who I know very well will sleep hungry with all her kids when I do so?’ 

Technological advances aided the flow of information to consumers, who are increasingly aware of their rights. Interviewees described how community monitoring improved as residents used WhatsApp groups to seek support in instances of injustices or irregularities, leading to court cases for collusion and price hikes. 

Relationships were key in resolving conflicts in a way that the utility could not do otherwise due to a history of distrust between low-income residents and government actors. A key informant described, ‘Within the slum areas, the government is always an enemy… so if you are from the county, if you are KIWASCO, if you are the city, we interact with you very suspiciously.’ This distrust still creates problems when MOs lose their licenses due to fund mismanagement, which occurred for multiple MOs in Nyamasaria over the past year, and was documented in 2017 for three MOs in Nyawita (Boakye-Ansah et al., 2019). The utility staff may try to take over operations, but social distrust means they may be met with hostility, vandalism, or sabotage.

The DMM encouraged individual women and groups to get involved in water service provision, but they are still under-represented in the water sector. St Anne’s is a registered women’s community-based organization on the northwest outskirts of Kisumu that became involved in the DMM in 2013. But in other parts of the city, multiple women-run MOs have been shut down due to issues of financial mismanagement. Some attribute this to young women moving away and elderly women lacking the skills to maintain the business. 

Water remains a gendered issue in the household, and male consumers would frequently decline interviews, sometimes becoming agitated when asked about household water practices. For women consumers, interviews and surveys suggested that women may be exploited for sexual favours in exchange for water—a phenomenon that has been documented elsewhere in Kenya (KEWASNET & ANEW, 2020).

KISUMU TODAY

Today, the biggest challenges facing Kisumu are related to the quality of the water and the integrity of the physical network.

The two main sources of water are Lake Victoria and the Kijulu River. Lake Victoria is affected by pollution from harmful agricultural and industrial practices, leading to a high nutrient load and algal blooms. KIWASCO struggles to treat the water to an acceptable quality without interruptions, and the odour from the lake affects users’ confidence in the water at their taps. At the Kijulu River intake, seasonal low flows have worsened with climate change. Vendors noted a decrease in the amount of time that water is available at the tap, and challenges with low water pressure.

Consumers don’t trust either vendors or the utility to provide good quality water. Independent sources do little to address this challenge, as fluoride and chloride content in most boreholes are above the recommended maximum values for both the World Health Organization and the Kenyan Bureau of Standards (Kanoti 2019). As described by a participant, 

‘when [the groundwater] is used to cook porridge, it turns yellow, and when used to cook food and left overnight, it starts foaming.’ 

We spoke to vendors who were concerned about water-borne illnesses, especially during the dry season when users start supplementing with the polluted river water. Even at the most urban sites, some consumers relied on rivers and shallow wells. 

Insights from Kisumu can also help inform governments and utilities across the globe as they consider partnerships with informal providers. Though capacity is required for coordination of efforts between formal and informal actors, such efforts have potential benefits for the vendors, consumers, government, and utility actors. However, where enforcement is lacking, such efforts may ultimately provide little benefit to consumers while creating more hassle for the vendors. 

Places where capacity is lacking to expand water supply infrastructure may instead benefit from reducing friction between formal and informal water providers. Low degrees of government engagement correspond with higher degrees of citizen involvement, and do not involve much cooperation or coordination between actors. But importantly, efforts to encourage positive engagement may require moving beyond framing vendors as a response to government and utility failures, as these narratives may put formal actors on the defensive.

Our findings suggest that the most important priority for water supply in Kisumu is investment in adequate water supply infrastructure that can address issues related to water quality and intermittent supply. Water quality is a major source of distrust for consumers, and building trust will require working with stakeholders to address the environmental challenges at their root in addition to ensuring adequate treatment. Infrastructure breakages prevent adequate supply to consumers, but are also a source of confusion and worry for vendors regarding liability for bill payments. As the county upgrades infrastructure, parallel steps could be taken to mitigate the risk of pipe rupture and minimise billing challenges for intermediate suppliers in low-income areas. 

Using evidence to tweak the DMM offers an opportunity for global leadership on a hybrid system that harnesses the contributions of informality without rushing to eradicate it. In the near term, formalised systems are unlikely to adequately meet the needs of rapidly growing cities at the pace necessary. An emphasis on formalisation risks undermining the trust that has been built within the DMM. For example, handcart vendors play a role in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable residents, and small improvements could greatly improve health and affordability outcomes. Targeted subsidies or reimbursement schemes for these vendors may greatly reduce high water costs for the poorest consumers. Decentralised strategies may be able to accomplish similar objectives, such as creating associations for peer-based accountability for quality and price, as seen among pushcarts in Niger (Youngstedt et al., 2016) and tankers in Angola (Cain & Baptista, 2020). 

Similarly, improving the business relationship between the vendors, MOs, and the utility may help ensure just outcomes. A better understanding of the MOs’ profit margins over time could shed light on their investment needs, leading to targeted financial support and training. The current system risks creating a ‘race to the bottom’ as MOs feel pressured to accept contract terms because they fear losing the opportunity. Changes could enable the utility to improve their contracting process to be more responsive to vendors’ needs and mitigate recurring issues, such as financial mismanagement.